Comments on: Essay: Government Debt and Metaphysical Identity http://dissense.com/2010/02/essay-government-debt-and-metaphysical-identity/ Only the most inreasonable ideas... Tue, 06 Jul 2010 18:52:16 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.1 By: Felix York http://dissense.com/2010/02/essay-government-debt-and-metaphysical-identity/comment-page-1/#comment-34 Felix York Mon, 08 Mar 2010 20:03:24 +0000 http://dissense.com/?p=254#comment-34 Everything is predicated on the notion that a state, qua state, can incur a debt. If that is the case, attributing that debt, then, to a metaphysically discontinuous state would be the equivalent of attributing it to some other nation entirely. If, however, you believe that governments really are just proxies for persons, and that citizens can be liable for their nations' debts, the argument will not be persuasive. Everything is predicated on the notion that a state, qua state, can incur a debt. If that is the case, attributing that debt, then, to a metaphysically discontinuous state would be the equivalent of attributing it to some other nation entirely.

If, however, you believe that governments really are just proxies for persons, and that citizens can be liable for their nations’ debts, the argument will not be persuasive.

]]> By: Mack Eason http://dissense.com/2010/02/essay-government-debt-and-metaphysical-identity/comment-page-1/#comment-33 Mack Eason Sun, 07 Mar 2010 22:57:27 +0000 http://dissense.com/?p=254#comment-33 Mr. York: Out of philosophical curiosity, why did you chose internal consistency as your metric for continued state identity? Mr. Goodwin brings up the alternative metric of representativeness in a later note. It would seem that this metric (while problematic in its own right) would solve some of the more odd implications of your metric (i.e. predicating repayment of debt on the relative similarity of political structures rather than on the continued identity of a people who may have enjoyed the benefit of previous international loans). Mr. York: Out of philosophical curiosity, why did you chose internal consistency as your metric for continued state identity? Mr. Goodwin brings up the alternative metric of representativeness in a later note. It would seem that this metric (while problematic in its own right) would solve some of the more odd implications of your metric (i.e. predicating repayment of debt on the relative similarity of political structures rather than on the continued identity of a people who may have enjoyed the benefit of previous international loans).

]]> By: Felix York http://dissense.com/2010/02/essay-government-debt-and-metaphysical-identity/comment-page-1/#comment-27 Felix York Thu, 25 Feb 2010 19:40:46 +0000 http://dissense.com/?p=254#comment-27 Your point is a fair one, and I never claimed to be advocating a wise policy so much as a philosophical distinction. That said, I do acknowledge that, for matters of policy, nations that no longer are technically indebted may want to assume the debts of their predecessors anyway to establish good credit (as in the case of the United States post-Constitution). In any case, states with unstable political systems seem unlikely to do much better in the status quo; there're more reasons than metaphysical continuity to doubt repayment in such circumstances. Your point is a fair one, and I never claimed to be advocating a wise policy so much as a philosophical distinction. That said, I do acknowledge that, for matters of policy, nations that no longer are technically indebted may want to assume the debts of their predecessors anyway to establish good credit (as in the case of the United States post-Constitution).

In any case, states with unstable political systems seem unlikely to do much better in the status quo; there’re more reasons than metaphysical continuity to doubt repayment in such circumstances.

]]> By: Garbanzo McArthur http://dissense.com/2010/02/essay-government-debt-and-metaphysical-identity/comment-page-1/#comment-24 Garbanzo McArthur Thu, 25 Feb 2010 14:37:00 +0000 http://dissense.com/?p=254#comment-24 Mr. York: I'm afraid your principle, if accepted as policy, would deny capital to those countries that need it most. Who in their right mind would lend to an unstable political system if any run-of-the-mill coup were enough to turn the loan into a gratuity? At the very least, exorbitant interest rates would be demanded to compensate for the added risk. Mr. York: I’m afraid your principle, if accepted as policy, would deny capital to those countries that need it most. Who in their right mind would lend to an unstable political system if any run-of-the-mill coup were enough to turn the loan into a gratuity? At the very least, exorbitant interest rates would be demanded to compensate for the added risk.

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